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Abstract—With the rising popularity of machine learning and
the ever increasing demand for computational power, there is
a growing need for hardware optimized implementations of
neural networks and other machine learning models. As the
technology evolves, it is also plausible that machine learning
or artificial intelligence will soon become consumer electronic
products and military equipment, in the form of well-trained
models. Unfortunately, the modern fabless business model of
manufacturing hardware, while economic, leads to deficiencies in
security through the supply chain. In this paper, we illuminate
these security issues by introducing hardware Trojan attacks on
neural networks, expanding the current taxonomy of neural net-
work security to incorporate attacks of this nature. To aid in this,
we develop a novel framework for inserting malicious hardware
Trojans in the implementation of a neural network classifier.
We evaluate the capabilities of the adversary in this setting
by implementing the attack algorithm on convolutional neural
networks while controlling a variety of parameters available to
the adversary. Our experimental results show that the proposed
algorithm could effectively classify a selected input trigger as
a specified class on the MNIST dataset by injecting hardware
Trojans into 0.03%, on average, of neurons in the 5th hidden
layer of arbitrary 7-layer convolutional neural networks, while
undetectable under the test data. Finally, we discuss the potential
defenses to protect neural networks against hardware Trojan
attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid evolution of machine learning has advanced nu-
merous research fields and industries, including safety-critical
areas such as biometric security, autonomous driving, cyber-
security, health, and financial planning [1]–[7]. Technology
and human life become increasingly intertwined, which has
resulted in a growing priority with regards to the security of
machine learning. However, due to the ubiquity and complex-
ity of machine learning especially deep neural networks, it has
been shown recently that these techniques are quite vulnerable
to well-crafted attacks [8]–[11], which raised security concerns
in the practical deployment of machine learning technologies.
Meanwhile, as the amount of available data is vastly increas-
ing and applications are becoming tremendously sophisticated,
deep learning has emerged as a promising research area
that could approach human-level performance. Deep learning
usually involves much larger and deeper networks, whose effi-
ciency on large datasets becomes a bottleneck. In recent years,
various specific hardware acceleration techniques have been
investigated to overcome the physical constraints of certain
machine learning applications [12], [13]. Given this evolution,
it is highly plausible that machine learning, in the form of
well-trained models, will soon become pervasive in consumer
electronic products and military equipment. However, along
with opportunities, this paradigm shift also brings new security
risks and concerns.
Attacks on machine learning models in prior works can
be mainly classified into those conducted in the training
phase, controlling the training algorithm, and those in the
application phase, taking advantage of faults in the well-
trained model [14]. However, to the best of our knowledge,
the analysis of the supply chain security has never been the
subject of any study for adversarial machine learning. Indeed,
the assumption that hardware is trustworthy and that security
effort needs only encompass networks and software is no
longer valid given the current semiconductor industry trends
that involve design outsourcing and fabrication globalization.
To expand studies on the hardware attack space on neural
networks, we examine a new threat model where the ad-
versary attempts to maliciously modify the machine learning
hardware device by inserting a stealthy hardware ”backdoor”,
i.e., hardware Trojan [15], [16]. Through the hardware Trojan,
the adversary will be able to gain access to the well-trained
model or alter the prediction of the machine learning system,
which could provide the adversary a strong advantage after
the devices are deployed in applications. For example, an
adversary in a position to profit from excessive or improper
sale of specific pharmaceutics could inject hardware Trojans
on a device for diagnosing patients using neural network
models. The attacker could cause the device to misdiagnose
selected patients to gain additional profit.
In this paper, we develop a novel framework of hardware
Trojan attacks on neural networks. The major contributions of
this paper are summarized below:
• This work introduces, for the first time, hardware Trojan
attacks in the scope of neural networks. To the best of our
knowledge, the only other attack on a neural network in
the hardware domain comes in the form of fault injection
techniques on the parameters of a well-trained network
[17]. Our attack deviates from this work, as we attempt to
specifically target the hardware circuitry of the network
without modifying any weights. In addition, the hardware
Trojan is inserted during the supply chain, while the fault
injection is applied in the application phase.
• This paper expands the current taxonomy of neural net-
work security to include this new attack, which also
provides a basis for categorizing potential future new
attacks in the hardware domain.
• We propose several algorithms for strategically inserting
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TABLE I. List of notations used in this paper.
Notation Name Description
F (·) network model A function representing the mapping between the input and the output of a neural network.
Fl1:l2(·) sub-network A function implemented by a subset (i.e., from layer l1 to layer l2) of the neural network.
fl(·) activation function The activation function of the entire layer l.
Wl weight matrix A matrix of the weights including bias associated with layer l.
Hl intermediate value The internal activations after hidden layer l of the neural network.
(X,Y ) labeled data A set of input vectors X and the correct labels Y ; x and y denote single elements from these sets.
(˜·) Trojan-injected instance An element of a neural network which is compromised by a hardware Trojan.
x˜ input trigger The input that triggers the malicious behavior of an injected hardware Trojan.
y˜ intended prediction The malicious output of the neural network when hardware Trojan is triggered.
Hl−1 Trojan trigger The intermediate value triggers the Trojan in layer l.
p perturbation The difference between Trojan-injected H˜l and the original Hl.
T dynamic range The dynamic range of hl determines the perturbation constraint.
hardware Trojans into a neural network under different
adversarial scenarios.
• We also discuss several possible defense approaches
against the proposed attacks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II briefly reviews the basics of neural networks and hardware
Trojans. Section III expands the current taxonomy of neural
network security to more easily encompass the types of attacks
possible in the hardware and then defines a threat model for
our adversarial setting. In Section IV, several novel algorithms
for injecting Trojans are proposed. Then, we present the
experimental setup used to test the algorithms and evaluate
their performance in Section V. Section VI discusses the
possible defenses available to the designer against malicious
hardware Trojan attacks. Finally, Section VII presents remarks
and concludes this paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Neural Network
A neural network is a model of machine learning that uti-
lizes successive layers of neurons to compute an approximate
mapping from an input space to an output space [18]. The
input layer is usually used as a placeholder for the primary
inputs, which communicates to the output layer through one
or more hidden layers. Each neuron computes a weighted sum
of the output vector from the previous layer, then optionally
applies an activation function, and finally outputs the value,
as shown in Fig. 1.
Σ f hi
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Fig. 1. The basic operation and function of a neuron.
The notations used throughout this paper are summarized in
Table I. By using these notations, the function of each layer
can be formally defined as
Hl = fl(Wl ·Hl−1). (1)
Consequently, by feeding the output of each layer to the
input of the subsequent layer, the entire network can be
characterized as: yp = F (x,W ).
Before the neural network can produce the desired results,
the parameters of the network must be trained. Utilizing a
cost function, C(y, F (x,W )), a measure quantifying the error
between the network’s predicted output and its desired value
under a given input, W can be modified to produce the desired
output. Specifically, supervised learning backpropagates the
gradients of the cost function with Equation 2 and updating
the network weight iteratively.
∇C(y, F (x,W )) =
[
δC(y, F (x,W ))
δw
]
w∈W
. (2)
B. Adversarial Example
An adversarial example is an attack on a machine learning
model which attempts to generate an input in such a way
that it would be correctly classified by a human observer
but is misclassified by the neural network [10], [19]–[22]. In
other words, the goal of this attack is to find an input x∗,
close to a natural input vector x, such that F (x∗) 6= F (x).
Despite networks having high levels of accuracy on normal
inputs, prior works show that neural networks are extremely
susceptible to these well-crafted attacks. Notably, these per-
turbations also generalize well to different networks as the
same perturbations have been shown to be capable of fooling
multiple networks [20].
In the literature, a large number of works on adversar-
ial examples have been developed for generating stronger
methods of producing the adversarial inputs [19], [23]. For
instance, the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [10] generates
the adversarial example in the direction of the sign of the
cost function’s gradient to produce an adversarial input with
very slight perturbation. The jacobian-based saliency maps
attack (JSMA) algorithm [9] uses the gradients of the learned
function, rather than the cost function, to produce a saliency
map of the input. The saliency map could indicate whether
specific values of the input should be increased or decreased
to produce a desired change in the output. Besides, several
advanced adversarial attacks have also been proposed recently
to compromise specific defense mechanisms [24] or extend to
different network architectures and adversarial scenarios [25].
C. Hardware Trojan
Modern integrated circuit design often involves a number
of design houses, fabrications houses, third-party IP, and
electronic design automation tools that are all supplied by
different vendors. Such horizontal business model makes the
security extremely difficult to manage during the supply chain.
Any of the parties involved in the process may hold incentives
to insert hardware Trojans (i.e., maliciously modify the hard-
ware implementation) into the design. Typically, the hardware
Trojan would only be activated by rare trigger conditions such
that infected devices can still pass a normal functional test
without being detected. Thus, hardware Trojan attack can be
a critical threat due to its stealthy nature. A hardware Trojan
is usually characterized by the activation mechanism (i.e.,
trigger) and the effect on the circuit functionality when it
is triggered (i.e., payload) [15]. When the trigger condition
is satisfied, the payload will accomplish the objective of the
Trojan. In the literature, various types of hardware Trojans
have been developed [15], [16], [26], [27].
III. THREAT MODEL AND TAXONOMY
In the context of machine learning, the adversary could
inject Trojans into the model by maliciously altering its
weights so that the neural network will malfunction when the
Trojan is triggered. In the literature, several works on neural
network software Trojan attacks have been developed [28]–
[30]. From the supply chain perspective, maliciously intended
modifications to these devices during the process can further
provide attackers with new capabilities of altering the func-
tions of internal neurons and causing adversarial functionality.
Hardware Trojans can be inserted into a device during man-
ufacturing by an untrusted semiconductor foundry or through
the integration of an untrusted third-party IP. Furthermore, a
foundry or even a designer may possibly be pressured by the
government to maliciously manipulate the design for overseas
products, which can then be weaponized. Therefore, it is
of great importance to examine the implication of hardware
Trojan on neural networks. In this paper, we expand the attacks
on neural networks from the training and application phases
to the production phase.
A. Threat Model
Unlike software Trojans, hardware Trojans consider the
malicious modification of the original circuitry [15], [16]. An
inserted hardware Trojan will change circuit functionality by
adding, deleting or modifying the components to wrest control
from the original chip owners. As opposed to software Trojans,
hardware Trojans would have both capabilities of changing
the weights and altering the functionalities of specific neurons
depending on the threat model. This difference undoubtedly
leads to vastly distinct insertion and design strategies for neural
network hardware Trojans. Indeed, given that the hardware
Trojan produces new threat models with no equivalent soft-
ware counterpart, attack and defense scenarios must be first
studied.
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Fig. 2. The adversarial setting considered in this paper.
In this paper, we consider a threat model that assumes an
adversary is positioned in the supply chain of an integrated
circuit containing a well-trained neural network model, as
shown in Fig. 2. This threat model is particularly revelent given
that many companies wish to use offshore state-of-the-art
technologies to remain competitive in the market, especially
for neural network devices whose performance are crucial
for real-time applications. It is also plausible that, due to
potential speed-ups and improvements in power consumption,
the designer desires to hard-wire the network parameters.
This setting would give the adversary direct knowledge of
architecture and all weights associated with the well-trained
model. However, the adversary would not have the knowledge
of the training or test data.
The objective of the adversary is to insert a hardware Trojan
into the original design of the neural network circuit forcing a
specific trigger input to be misclassified to either a targeted
or an untargeted class. Under this scenario, the adversary
can modify both the weights and the functionalities of circuit
components prior to shipment. In order to evade detection,
the adversary should ensure the hardware Trojan is stealthy
enough such that the predictions for the unknown test data
are completely unmodified. In addition, the physical footprint
of the hardware Trojan must remain sufficiently tiny; thus, the
Trojan-injected circuit would be difficult to differentiate from
the original ”golden circuit”. In this paper, we focus on the
hardware Trojan attack on neural network circuit components,
while we expect the hardware Trojan targeting on the weights
would yield a similar impact as the software Trojan or fault
injection attack.
B. Expanding the Taxonomy of Neural Network Attacks
In the literature, taxonomy of attacks on neural networks [8],
[9], [14] are divided into the four domains: the phase at which
the attack is initiated, the goal of the attacker, the scope of
the attack, and the attacker’s knowledge of the system, as
shown in Fig. 3. In particular, the attacks are classified into
two phases according to the stages of the neural network: the
training phase and the application/inference phase [14]. An
attack in the training phase seeks to take control over the
training algorithm by maliciously altering the trained model.
On the other hand, an attack in the inference phase attempts to
explore possible flaws in the trained model without tampering
with the network. Given the threat model we described above,
we consider the attacks on the production phase of the well-
trained neural network for the first time, to the best of our
knowledge. Note that the fault injection attack on the neural
network [17] still falls into the inference or application phase.
Since the described threat model assumes partial knowledge of
the neural network model, the hardware Trojan attack is con-
sidered as a greybox attack. In sum, we consider the hardware
Trojan attack during the production phase to compromise the
reliability of neural networks with both targeted and untargeted
scopes in this paper, as circled in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. The expanded taxonomy of neural network attacks.
IV. ALGORITHMS FOR HARDWARE TROJAN ATTACKS ON
NEURAL NETWORKS
In this section, we first build a general framework for
inserting hardware Trojans in neural networks under the threat
model presented in Section III, and then develop several
algorithms for different adversarial scenarios.
A. General Framework
The proposed framework consists of two main steps: (i)
malicious behavior generation, i.e., determining the neuron(s)
to inject the Trojan and the corresponding perturbations, and
(ii) hardware Trojan implementation, i.e., designing the trigger
and payload circuitry. Our proposed methodology provides an
adversary the flexibility in selecting the targeted layer of a
neural network for injecting hardware Trojan. Without loss of
generality, we assume the targeted layer is layer l. An example
of Trojan-injected neural network is shown in Fig. 4. When
the trigger condition is satisfied, the injected neurons will
propagate the malicious behaviors to subsequently layers and
finally modify the output prediction, as marked in red in Fig. 4.
Note that multiple Trojans need to be injected to achieve the
attacking objective in most cases, as each operation in the
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Fig. 4. A neural network injected with hardware Trojans, the effect
of the Trojans is propagating through some neurons but can be filtered
out on others.
network has a minor effect on the output within the dynamic
range T , especially for deep neural networks.
Due to the layered structure, a neural network can be divided
into sub-networks separated at the layer l, which can be
expressed as
F (x) = Fl+1:L(Hl); Hl = Fl:l(Hl−1) and Hl−1 = F0:l−1(x).
(3)
This modularity is further increased by the natural division
of operations inside a network layer. For example, as shown
in Fig. 1, a dense layer is usually composed of multiplication
operations followed by an accumulation operation and finally
an activation function, plus any additional operations such
as pooling. These operations create additional natural break
points in which an adversary can inject Trojans.
To perform the hardware Trojan attack, the adversary also
needs to pick an input trigger x˜. In the proposed framework,
the trigger can be chosen arbitrarily or similar to legitimate
inputs to achieve a higher degree of stealthiness. Then, we
use the input trigger and the functions representing the first
two sub-networks to obtain the intermediate values following
the first and second subnetworks, i.e., Hl−1 = F0:l−1(x˜)
and Hl = Fl:l(Hl−1). We then apply a modified adversarial
sampling algorithm with respect to the target layer to find
perturbation needed to induce in the layer l to achieve either
a targeted or untargeted attack. In order words, the goal is
to generate H˜l = Hl + p such that Fl+1:L(H˜l) is altered as
intended, while the perturbation p for each modified neuron is
bounded by the dynamic range based on the neural network
model. Finally, the Trojan circuitry is designed according to
the required perturbations and intermediate value.
B. Malicious Behavior Generation
While any approach in the existing literature of produc-
ing adversarial examples may be incorporated in the above
framework, we choose to develop our approaches based on
the JSMA algorithm [9], since it is designed specifically for
minimizing the L0−norm which could potentially minimize
hardware modification for Trojan insertion. The JSMA algo-
rithm generates a Jacobian matrix with respect to the input and
then utilizes the Jacobian with a set of rules to build a saliency
map. By modifying the rules when constructing the saliency
map, different adversarial objectives can be prioritized.
As opposed to the original JSMA algorithm, in our proposed
method, we modify the Jacobian as presented in Equation 4.
J(Hl) =
[
δFl+1:L(Hl)[c]
δHl
]
c∈C
. (4)
Calculating the Jacobian begins at each output and is forward
propagated to the target layer using the following modified
version of the chain rule.
δHli
δHl
= Hli ·Wli ·
δHli−1
δHl
(5)
Each column in the Jacobian corresponds to a specific output
while each row is linked to a specific neuron in the targeted
layer. This is distinct from the original algorithm as the rows
of the original Jacobian matrix were linked to the input image.
The element at the intersections of these rows and columns of
this matrix indicate the strength of the correlation between
the nueron/output pair. In this way, each entry of the Jacobian
matrix indicates the correlation under the L0−norm between
the output classification and the intermediate value. It should
be noted that each neuron is often tied to multiple outputs with
varying strengths and so selecting the neurons should be done
through a strict set of rules.
Consequently, a saliency map can be generated using the
Jacobian matrix based on the specific goal of the adversary.
An attacker with a targeted scope seeks to accomplish the goal
in a specific way, while the untargeted scope simply attempts
to cause the specified input to misclassify to any other classes.
In our methodology, we modify the rules for building the
saliency map to incorporate both scopes. For instance, in an
untargeted attack, the difference between the negative values
in the column corresponding to the predicted class, dx−p , and
the positive values from every other column, dx+i 6=p, can be
used to form the saliency map:
S(x)[i] = βp
∣∣dx−p ∣∣+ βs∑
i 6=p
dx+i . (6)
Each entry in this map essentially indicates the effectiveness
of simultaneously achieving the primary goal (i.e. decreasing
the confidence of the predicted class) and the secondary goal
(increasing the probability of a different class) by modifying
the corresponding neuron. To gain optimal results in specific
adversarial settings, βp and βs are introduced to weight the
primary and secondary goals.
However, the goal in a targeted attack is to decrease the
probability of the targeted class over that of the predicted
class. Consequently, decreasing the probability of the currently
predicted class remains the primary goal but the attack also
incorporates an auxiliary goal of increasing the confidence of
the target class. We also imposing a secondary goal of keeping
the remaining probabilities low. Thus, we formulate a saliency
map using Equation (7).
S(x)[i] = βp
∣∣dx−p ∣∣+ βadx+t + βs ∑
i 6=t,p
∣∣dx−i ∣∣, (7)
Here we include three constants; βp, βa and βs, to weight the
primary, auxiliary and secondary goals to gain optimal results
in specific adversarial settings.
To find the modification needed in Hl, we perturb the opera-
tion associated with the largest values in the vector and modify
them according to the adversarial objective. The magnitude of
the perturbation should be bounded by the dynamic range T
in the original neural network. For example, the value after the
Trojan-injected neuron should be bounded between -1 and 1
if the activation is tanh. A ReLU activation function leads to
a theoretically unbounded upper limit; however, in a practical
real world attack any modifications would be limited due to
the physical representation of the values. For the bounded
attack, we use a bounding list, L, to lock neurons that cannot
be further altered in the desired direction. We present the
algorithms for the untargeted attack and the targeted attack
in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, respectively.
Algorithm 1 Untargeted Hardware Trojan Attack
Require: F (·), x˜, T, l
1: F (·)→ F0:l−1(·), Fl:l(·) and Fl+1:L(·)
2: Hl−1 = F0:l−1(x˜)
3: H˜l = Hl = Fl:l(Hl−1)
4: yp = Fl+1:L(Hl)
5: L = [ ]
6: while Fl+1:L(H˜l) = yp and ||p| | < T do
7: forward propagate J(H˜l)
8: S = Untargeted SM(J(H˜l), yp), using Equation (6)
9: increase h˜n = argmax(S)
10: p = H˜l −Hl
11: if
∣∣∣h˜n∣∣∣ exceeds T then
12: L.append(hn)
13: generate trigger design based on Hl−1
14: generate payload design using p
Algorithm 2 Targeted Hardware Trojan Attack
Require: F (·), x˜, y˜, T, l
1: F (·)→ F0:l−1(·), Fl:l(·) and Fl+1:L(·)
2: Hl−1 = F0:l−1(x˜)
3: H˜l = Hl = Fl:l(Hl−1)
4: L = [ ]
5: while Fl+1:L(H˜l) 6= y˜ and ||p| | < T do
6: forward propagate J(H˜l)
7: S = Targeted SM(J(H˜l), y˜), using Equation (7)
8: increase h˜n = argmax(S)
9: p = H˜l −Hl
10: if
∣∣∣h˜n∣∣∣ exceeds T then
11: L.append(hn)
12: generate Trojan trigger design based on Hl−1
13: generate Trojan payload design using p
In addition to the original saliency map that indicates which
neuron outputs to increase, we implemented the targeted attack
with a second saliency map that indicates which neuron
outputs to decrease. This slight modification allowed our
implementation to mount attacks more quickly and efficiently
than when utilizing only the single saliency map above.
C. Hardware Trojan Implementation
The implementation of the hardware Trojan design is highly
dependent on the specific neural network architecture and the
injected component of choice. Here, we only lay the ground-
work and describe several possible designs. Note that other
hardware Trojan designs of different types but with similar
functionalities can also be incorporated into the proposed
framework.
The trigger of the hardware Trojan should be designed based
on the internal state of the injected location, i.e., the produced
Hl−1 when feeding x˜ through F0:l−1(·). In addition, the
triggerability must be extremely low to ensure the stealthiness
of the hardware Trojan. A combinational circuit can be used
to trigger the Trojan when even Hl−1 closely resembles H˜l−1.
In the proposed framework, the payload should be designed to
achieve the needed perturbation p(Hl) obtained from the mali-
cious behavior generation step. We can either use a multiplexer
logic which selects output of malicious logic only when the
Trojan is activated, or alter the internal structure of the certain
operations to inject malicious behavior. For instance, several
multipliers can be modified to produce rare outputs given the
vector of Hl−1. We can also target on the activation function
of each layer to directly alter Hl after the layer. Although our
algorithms for malicious behavior generation are designed to
minimize the hardware modification, we must still be careful in
selecting the payload design such that the magnitude of change
(e.g., the difference in side-channel leakage) is small enough
to evade existing hardware Trojan detection techniques. The
simplified block diagrams of two possible hardware Trojan
designs are shown in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 5. Simplified representations of two possible hardware Trojan
designs on a neural network.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Datasets and Neural Network Models
We use MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets to evaluate the
proposed methodology. Both datasets are composed of 10
mutually exclusive classes. The detailed hyperparameters of
models that we implemented in our experiments are sum-
marized in Table II. We pre-train the networks to achieve
test accuracies above 99% and 80% on the MNIST and the
CIFAR10 datasets, respectively, which are consistent with the
state-of-the-art. We then consider these models as the original
benign models to inject hardware Trojan using the proposed
algorithms. We run the experiments on a cluster node with
NVIDIA Tesla GPUs. The training of the neural networks is
implemented using Tensorflow [31].
TABLE II. Summaries of network architectures
MNIST CIFAR-10
layer type # neurons type # neurons
1 conv 20 15680 conv 32 28800
2 conv/max 40 31360 conv/max 64 50176
3 conv 60 11760 conv/max 128 18432
4 conv/max 80 15680 conv/max 128 2048
5 conv 120 5880 dense 1024
6 dense 150 dense 180
7 dense 10 dense 10
max-pooling size: 2x2, kernel size: 3x3
B. Adversarial Scenarios
1) Scope of the Attack: We evaluate both targeted and
untargeted hardware Trojan attacks on the above neural
networks. In our experiments, we use every other class of
each dataset excepted the correct label as the targeted class
for the targeted attack. While for the untargeted attack, we
simply attempt to alter the prediction without a targeted class.
2) Input Trigger Selection: In our experiments, we consider
two different input trigger designs, i.e., well-crafted and ran-
dom input triggers. Well-crafted input triggers are intended to
achieve higher degrees of stealthiness against human observers
by making the trigger very close to legitimate inputs. In order
to ensure the similarity of the well-crafted input trigger, x˜,
to the test images, we randomly pull a single instance from
the test set and form a new set for testing with the remaining
samples. Randomized images adhering to the standards of the
datasets are used as random input trigger.
3) Payload Constraint: The possible magnitude of per-
turbation generated by the payload is constrained by the
dynamic range of the original benign model. We use ReLU
as the activation function on each layer when illustrating
the unbounded scenario, while using tanh as the activation
function for the bounded scenario.
4) Targeted Layer: We examine the performance of hard-
ware Trojan attacks on all hidden layers and the output layer.
We show that the proposed method could inject hardware
Trojans into any layer to generate malicious behavior and
compare the effectiveness and stealthiness of different layers
of choice.
C. Metrics
The successfulness of a hardware Trojan attack is measured
by its capabilities of altering the predictions and evading
TABLE III. Random input triggers for targeted attacks
MNIST CIFAR-10
bound unbound bound unbound
layer mfn (%) eff (%) mfn (%) eff (%) mfn (%) eff (%) mfn (%) eff (%)
1 0.19 100 0.06 100 0.21 100 0.09 100
2 0.10 98 0.04 100 0.14 100 0.06 100
3 0.39 95 0.14 100 0.15 100 0.09 100
4 0.22 100 0.07 100 0.81 100 0.54 100
5 1.51 96 0.09 98 4.57 100 0.34 100
6 8.13 100 2.71 100 13.53 100 1.69 100
7 21.20 100 30.53 100 20.20 100 21.80 100
detection. In this work, we use the effectiveness and the
stealthiness to evaluate these metrics. Additionally, we use the
number of modified neurons to show the magnitude of change
from the hardware implementation perspective. In sum, we
define the following metrics:
• Effectiveness (eff ) is the percentage of input triggers
classified as the intended label, in either targeted or
untargeted scenarios. An effective hardware Trojan attack
should yield a high value (i.e., close to 100%) of this
metric.
• Stealthiness (stl) is the percentage of the outputs ob-
tained from the Trojan-injected network matches the
predictions of the benign network. Ideally, this metric
should be 100% to avoid detection by test data that are
unknown to the adversary, when returned to the designer.
• Number of modified neurons (mfn) is the average num-
ber of neurons that are modified to generate the desired
malicious behavior. This metric directly correlates to the
amount of hardware modifications needed to implement
the attack. This metric is also reported as the percentage
of neuron modified in the targeted layer needed to achieve
a misclassification.
D. Results and Discussion
The results of our experiments are summarized in Table III
and Table IV. Note that each experiment is conducted at least
1000 iterations and the averages are presented. In addition,
we test the stealthiness of the proposed methods using the
test data of each dataset. Our experimental results show
that the proposed algorithms achieve 100% stealthiness
for both datasets under all adversarial scenarios. It can
be seen from both Tables III and IV that the percentage
of modified neurons increases towards the latter layers of
both networks. However, if we compare the absolute value
of modified neurons, as shown in Figures 6 and 7, latter
layers actually require significantly less neurons to be modified
to inject malicious behavior. Thus, injecting into neurons in
latter layers could result in higher impact to the output, which
conforms to our expectation. Note that the lowest possible
percentage of modified neurons is 10% for the output layer,
since it has a total of 10 neurons in both networks.
We first use random input triggers to mount the hardware
Trojan attacks under the targeted adversarial scenarios. The
results are presented in Table III and Fig. 6. It can be seen that
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Fig. 6. Number of modified neurons per layer given random trigger
inputs in the targeted adversarial setting.
the targeted attack under the unbounded scenario is stronger
than the bounded scenario, as it requires less neurons to be
modified. In other words, different neural network designs
also lead to different levels of security from the hardware
perspective. It also appears that both of these attacks perform
well reaching near 100% effectiveness on all layers while
modifying only a small sample of the neurons. For example,
our method could effectively classify a random input trigger as
a specified class on the MNIST dataset by injecting hardware
Trojans into 0.04%, on average, of neurons in the 2nd hidden
layer the neural network.
We next evaluate the performance of well-crafted input
triggers on the datasets under the unbounded scenario. The
results are illustrated in Table IV and Fig. 7. It can be seen
that these attacks also achieve very high effectiveness, while
modifying a small percentage of the neurons. For instance,
our algorithm can effectively alter the classification of a well-
crafted input image in an untargeted scenario while only
altering, on average, 0.03% of the neurons in the 5th layer of
an MNIST classifier. Under this scenario, it can be observed
that the untargeted attack usually requires less modifications
than targeted attack, since it has the flexibility to select the
easiest malicious output.
When comparing the results between the MNIST and CI-
FAR10 classifiers under the same adversarial settings, we can
observe that attacks on the CIFAR10 classifier in general
require larger percentage of neurons to be modified. This
is further compounded by the fact that the majority of the
layers in the CIFAR10 classifier have more neurons than the
corresponding MNIST classifier. For example, when targeting
on the 2nd layer, our algorithm only needs to modify less than
50 neurons of the MNIST classifier, while over 200 neurons
TABLE IV. Well-crafted input triggers under the unbounded scenario
MNIST CIFAR-10
targeted untargeted targeted untargeted
layer mfn (%) eff (%) mfn (%) eff (%) mfn (%) eff (%) mfn (%) eff (%)
1 0.18 100 0.17 100 0.34 97 0.28 100
2 0.06 98 0.08 100 0.53 100 0.43 100
3 0.14 98 0.04 100 0.53 100 0.36 100
4 0.09 100 0.13 100 0.66 100 0.45 100
5 0.39 99 0.03 100 0.90 100 0.15 100
6 1.83 100 0.67 100 2.11 97 0.55 100
7 22.17 100 10.00 100 29.30 97 10.00 100
have to be altered in the CIFAR10 classifier.
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Fig. 7. Number of modified neurons per layer given well-crafted
trigger inputs in the unbounded adversarial setting.
Finally, we observe that the adversary’s choice of input
trigger affects the strength of the attack. By comparing ex-
perimental results between the well-crafted and random input
triggers of the CIFAR10 classifier, it is apparent that the
attacks based on well-crafted input triggers require more
modifications. Specifically, attacks on the second layer of the
network require almost 9 times more modifications with well-
crafted input triggers, compared to random input triggers.
Thus, random input trigger could achieve higher stealthiness.
VI. POTENTIAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES
In this section, we briefly discuss possible defense tech-
niques against the hardware Trojan attack on neural networks.
This type of attack using the proposed methodology will
inject malicious behavior with an extremely low trigger rate
into the original benign model by modifying the hardware
implementation. Although normal test data are very unlikely to
discover the malicious behavior, defense strategies from both
the hardware and the neural network algorithmic perspectives
can still be potentially utilized to improve the resilience of a
neural network model against such attacks.
On the one hand, various hardware Trojan detection meth-
ods have been developed in the literature, including but not
limited to optical inspection, logical testing, side-channel anal-
ysis, and run-time monitoring [32], [33]. Most of these tech-
niques require a ”golden circuit” and rely on a relatively signif-
icant difference between the ”golden circuit” and the Trojan-
injected circuit. However, these techniques such as detection
using side-channel information suffer from reduced sensitivity
toward small Trojans, especially given the relatively large
process variations in deep nanometer technologies [33]. Since
our algorithms attempt to minimize the hardware modification,
which has also been verified by our experimental results,
we expect such hardware Trojan detection methods would
be ineffective for defeating the proposed attack. In addition,
run-time monitoring techniques are usually very expensive
or incurring significant resource overheads [34]. Preventative
methods have also been proposed to make hardware Trojan
injection more difficult and non-functional, such as hardware
obfuscation [35] and split manufacturing [36]. However, given
the modularized operations of neural networks, the degree of
ambiguity these methods could create is extremely limited.
On the other hand, although no prior work has stud-
ied hardware Trojans on neural networks, defense strategies
against adversarial examples might possibly be extended to
improve the robustness of neural network models against
hardware Trojan injection. Recently, various methods have
been proposed to mitigate the effects of adversarial examples
by modifying the training algorithm or the network, or using
external add-ons. For example, adversarial training manually
inserts correctly labeled adversarial samples into the original
training data to improve the robustness of the model [37].
Besides, generative adversarial net (GAN) based approaches
utilize external discriminative network to improve the security
by classifying both original training samples and adversarial
samples generated by the generative network into the cor-
rect classes [38]. However, the adversarial samples will be
much harder to control when applying these methods against
hardware Trojan attacks, as the Trojans are injected into
hidden layers as opposed to manipulating the input samples.
Some other more advanced yet complex techniques, such as
the ensemble methods that generate multiple versions of a
classifier with differing network architectures [23], [39], are
cost-prohibitive to implement on hardware.
In our opinion, we believe one feasible protection method
entails the combination of both adversarial training and hard-
ware Trojan detection. Before production, adversarial training
can be used to improve the robustness, which could potentially
lead to a significant increase in the number of neurons need
to be modified to inject the intended malicious behavior.
Consequently, the magnitude of change when the injected
hardware Trojan is active might grow sufficiently large to
be discovered by hardware Trojan detection methods such as
side-channel based detection. Our ongoing work includes the
investigation of this combined defense strategy with various
detection approaches against the proposed hardware Trojan
attack framework.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have introduced the new hardware Trojan
attack on neural networks and expanded the taxonomy of
neural network attacks. Several novel algorithms have been
proposed to inject malicious behavior into the hardware im-
plementation of neural networks to achieve the targeted or
untargeted classification of selected input trigger. Experimental
results for different adversarial scenarios have demonstrated
the effectiveness of the proposed attacks. Possible defense
strategies have also been discussed.
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